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BARNES V. GLEN THEATRE, INC.: APPLICATION OF
INDIANA'S PUBLIC INDECENCY STATUTE TO NUDE
DANCING-IS THE SUPREME COURT STRIPPING
AWAY FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS TO REVEAL
A NEW STANDARD?
If the only way to exclude nude dancing from the protection of
the [First Ajmendment is to exclude all nonpolitical art and
literature as well, the price is too high. "A rule cannot be laid
down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas. " 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech has long enjoyed a
special place in American society. The United States Supreme Court has
described the constitutional right of free expression as "putting the deci-
sion as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
in the hope that the use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry and more perfect polity."2 Recently, in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. ,' the Court considered whether an Indiana statute banning
all public nudity met the requirements of the United States Constitution.'
In a five to four decision, the Court held that such a statute, as applied to
nude dancing, does not violate the First Amendment.5
This Note analyzes the plurality's reasoning, and discusses its incor-
rect interpretation and application of precedent in this case. Addition-
ally, this Note discusses the development of the Court's theory of "lesser
value" speech, including its application in Barnes, and identifies the dan-
gers of its continued application.6
1. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903)), rev'd sub nom.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). The First Amendment reads "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
2. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
3. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
4. Id. at 2458.
5. Id.
6. Because each Justice, with the exception of Justice Scalia, expressed the opinion that
the nude dancing at issue in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), is expressive
conduct meriting some First Amendment protection, this Note does not consider whether
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II. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence: Standard of Review
Generally, government is considered to have restricted speech if a
regulation is facially targeted7 at the suppression of ideas or information,
or if a governmental regulation is facially neutral8 but was motivated by
an intent to single out constitutionally protected speech for regulation.9
Therefore, if the government wishes to regulate the expressive activity
because of the communicative impact of a speaker's message, the regula-
tion should be strictly scrutinized ° to determine whether the govern-
ment had a compelling reason11 to restrict the speech. The government
has somewhat more latitude to regulate expression, however, when it
is doing so for reasons independent of the speech's content. 2 Regula-
tions based only upon the time, place or manner1 3 of speech are said to be
content-neutral. A content-neutral regulation is valid if it is: (1) justifi-
able without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) it
nude dancing should, per se, be considered expression for the purposes of the First Amend-
ment. For an interesting discussion regarding the expressive aspects of nude dancing, see
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-1104 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Pos-
ner, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
Additionally, this Note does not consider the validity of anti-pornography statutes or the
potentially harmful effects of pornography on women. For an interesting and in-depth discus-
sion on the constitutionality of feminist anti-pornography statutes see Note, Anti-Pornography
Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1984).
7. Facial targeting means that the statute restricts expression on the face of the regula-
tion. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed.
1987).
8. A facially neutral regulation does not textually single out a certain category of speech
for regulation but may have the effect of suppressing speech and therefore may be unconstitu-
tional. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 230 (1989); United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985); Wayne v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 602-05 (1984).
9. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-2, at 789-90, 794.
10. In order for a content-based regulation to be valid, the regulation must be necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (regulation must serve
compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest); see also Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (content-based regulations must be narrowly drawn
and based on compelling state interest); Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (regulations based on content must be based on compelling
interest and must be narrowly tailored).
11. For application of the compelling state interest standard, see Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
13. See infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time, place and
manner test.
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leaves open adequate alternative avenues for the protected
communication.
14
The time, place and manner test has been applied in a number of
situations involving the regulation of adult entertainment. 5 In City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 6 the Court upheld a city zoning regu-
lation that strictly limited the placement of adult theaters showing non-
obscene adult films.' 7 The Court acknowledged the statute's burden on
speech but upheld the regulation nonetheless.' The City of Renton opin-
ion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, reasoned that the seemingly content-
based distinction between adult theaters and other theaters was valid be-
cause the zoning ordinance was aimed at eliminating the secondary ef-
fects caused by the presence of adult theatres, not the dissemination of
"offensive" speech. 19 Justice Rehnquist noted that the appropriate in-
quiry is whether the ordinance is designed to serve a substantial govern-
mental interest and whether it allows for alternative avenues of
communication.20 In City of Renton the city's zoning regulation was
upheld because it left some areas of the city open for the protected com-
munication, and was thus considered a content-neutral restriction.2'
1. Symbolic speech
The Court has held that certain forms of conduct, as well as speech,
have the potential to communicate ideas and are, therefore, protected by
the First Amendment.22 Where expression is coupled with conduct,
14. The time, place and manner test has been applied in a number of First Amendment
cases including: Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989); Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. International Soe'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
15. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46 (adult theater zoning ordinance); Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74-77 (1981) (ordinance regulating nude dancing); Young,
427 U.S. at 63 (zoning ordinance targeting adult theaters); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 932 (1975) (ordinance regulating topless dancing).
16. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). In City of Renton the Court relied heavily on its previous decision
in Young which upheld, as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction, a Detroit
zoning ordinance that prohibited the location of an adult theater within 1000 feet of any two
"regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential zone. Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73.
17. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
18. Id. at 54.
19. Id. at 47.
20. Id. Under the time, place and manner test used in City ofRenton, a regulation is valid
if it is "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alterna-
tive avenues of communication." Id.
21. Id. at 54.
22. See, eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning American flag considered
January 1992]
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however, the standard of review is somewhat less stringent than that used
to analyze restrictions on verbal speech alone.23 The test for gauging the
validity of restrictions on expressive conduct was established in United
States v. O'Brien.24
To protest American involvement in the Vietnam War, O'Brien
burned his draft card in front of a sizeable crowd and was convicted
under a federal statute that prohibited the willful destruction or mutila-
tion of draft cards.25 In his defense, O'Brien claimed that the act of
burning his draft card was expressive conduct in the manner of symbolic
speech and that his conviction, therefore, violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.26 This argument
was not accepted by a majority of the Court, however, which held that
when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in restricting the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms.27 Specifically, the Court in O'Brien stated that where
speech and nonspeech elements of conduct are combined, a governmen-
tal regulation is justified if it is within the "constitutional power of the
government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that inter-
est."' 28 In O'Brien the Court found that a nonspeech element of conduct
(burning the draft card) was combined with a speech element (protest of
the Vietnam war).29 In applying the newly established test, the Court
found that the government's interest in a pool of available draft regis-
trants needed to facilitate quick induction into the military was a sub-
stantial enough governmental interest to justify the incidental restriction
on speech.30
expressive conduct); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (hanging flag upside down
and attaching peace symbols considered expressive conduct); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 12
(1971) (wearing jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" considered expressive conduct);
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing armbands to protest war con-
sidered expressive conduct).
23. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-7, at 832.
24. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
25. Id. at 369.
26. Id. at 376.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id. at 376.
30. Id. at 379.
[Vol. 25:595
January 1992] LESSER VALUE SPEECH
2. Obscenity
The Supreme Court has stated that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' 31 The
Court has held, however, that certain categories of expression-fighting
words, defamation and obscenity, for example-do not fall within the
realm of constitutionally protected expression. 32 Of these categories, ob-
scenity has proved one of the most difficult to define.33 Following a
lengthy struggle, the Court finally agreed upon the modern definition of
obscenity in Miller v. California.3 The Miller test contrasts the use of
contemporary community standards with the potential artistic, literary
or political value of the work.35 In applying this standard to state and
local regulation of obscene material, the Court acknowledged that the
states are free to regulate the display of obscene materials in public
places-but must adhere to the Court's definition of obscenity in drafting
regulations.36
3. Adult entertainment & nude dancing
The Court has addressed several cases in which the content of the
expressive activity at issue was considered "offensive" to some because of
its focus on an explicit sexual message, but did not fall within the formal
definition of obscenity.37 In the area of adult entertainment, the Court
31. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
32. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (setting forth categories
of unprotected speech).
33. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In a post-Roth decision, Justice Stew-
art highlighted the difficulty in defining a workable definition of "hard core" pornography,
which he believed to be obscenity, with the following statement: "[I would not attempt further
to define] the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
34. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
35. In Miller the Court held that the trier of fact must determine: (1) whether the average
person, applying "contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) whether the work "depicts or describes in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law"; and (3)
whether the work, "taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value." Id.
36. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973). The Court intended that the
obscenity standard encompass only "hard core" pornography because the Court felt that only
"hard core" pornography was so lacking in educational and artistic merit that it was not enti-
tled to any constitutional protection whatsoever. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (1957).
37. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (up-
holding FCC regulation restricting broadcast of indecent but not obscene language);
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has struggled to develop a standard for judging limitations on these types
of expression without violating the spirit of the First Amendment. When
the Court considers restrictions on certain categories of expression, such
as nude dancing or pornographic material, often it is faced with the bur-
den of weighing the precepts of free expression against claims that the
expression should be subjected to lesser scrutiny because of its inferior
value in the marketplace of ideas.3 8
One such area concerns the Court's treatment of nude entertain-
ment. Development of Supreme Court precedent in the area of nude
dancing has been both slow and curious. Historically, although various
cases suggested that nude dancing fell within the ambit of the First
Amendment,39 none expressly stated that conclusion prior to the Court's
decision in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim ." In Schad the Court
overturned a total ban on live entertainment as violative of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.4' Although the proposition that nude dancing
is entitled to some First Amendment protection is now generally ac-
cepted by the courts, until its decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. ,42
the Supreme Court had not defined the proper scope and level of
protection.4 3
Clues pointing to an emerging standard of review for nude dancing
cases could be found in several Supreme Court decisions. For example,
in California v. LaRue" the Court upheld a California Department of
Alcohol Beverage Control regulation that prohibited the service of alco-
hol in establishments where certain "grossly sexual exhibitions are per-
formed."45 In upholding the regulation, the Court noted that the state
was empowered to regulate such entertainment in establishments that
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (holding facially invalid as infringement
on First Amendment rights ordinance making it public nuisance and punishable offense for
drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity when screen is visible from public
places); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding that state may not make simple dis-
play of single word expletive criminal offense).
38. See infra notes 240-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory of "lesser
value" speech.
39. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
40. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
41. Id. at 77. The Court in Schad concluded that "nude dancing is not without its first
amendment protections from official regulations." Id. at 66. An entertainment program may
not be prohibited "solely because it displays the nude human figure." Id. (citing Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12, 213 (1975)).
42. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
43. Id. at 2460.
44. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
45. Id. at 119 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 25:595
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serve liquor under the United States Constitution's Twenty-First
Amendment." In LaRue Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
stated that "the critical fact is that California has not forbidden these
performances across the board[-][i]t has merely proscribed such per-
formances in establishments that it licenses to sell liquor."'47 Similarly, in
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc 4 the Court invalidated as overbroad a New
York statute that prohibited topless dancing in all public places.4 9 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, stated that the statute ex-
ceeded the state's power under the Twenty-First Amendment because it
applied to all commercial establishments, not just those serving alcohol.50
Prior to its decision in Barnes, the Court's last significant word on
nude dancing appeared in the case of Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim."1 In Schad the majority opinion, authored by Justice White,
declared a city zoning ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment un-
constitutionally overbroad. 2 Although Justice Rehnquist disagreed with
the Schad majority on the overbreadth ruling, he agreed that nude danc-
ing is constitutionally protected expression.53 Because the statute was
invalidated on overbreadth grounds, no standard of review for nude
dancing was established. A possible clue to an emerging standard, how-
ever, could be gleaned from Chief Justice Burger's dissenting statement
that "[t]he fact that [nude dancing] enjoys some constitutional protection
does not mean that there are not times and places inappropriate for its
exercise.
' 5 4
B. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
1. Factual and procedural history
In 1976 the Indiana State Legislature passed an indecency statute
flatly prohibiting any form of public nudity.55 Shortly thereafter two In-
46. Id. at 118. See infra note 222 for the text of the Twenty-First Amendment.
47. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118.
48. 422 U.S. 922 (1974).
49. Id. at 933-34.
50. Id.
51. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
52. Id. at 77.
53. Id. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
54. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
55. Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 148, § 1, 1976 Ind. Acts 752-53 (codified at IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1985)). Indiana's public indecency statute provides:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or
January 1992]
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diana establishments, the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theatre, wish-
ing to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment, along with two
dancers employed at these establishments, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the statute.
5 6
The establishments and dancers argued that the Indiana statute's
complete prohibition of nudity in public places violated the First Amend-
ment. 7 The district court initially granted their request for an in-
junction, finding the statute facially overbroad and therefore,
unconstitutional.5" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, how-
ever. It found that the limiting construction previously given the statute
by the Indiana Supreme Court precluded such a challenge because the
statute could not be applied to otherwise constitutionally protected pub-
lic nudity.59 The case was then remanded and the district court was in-
structed to consider whether or not the Indiana indecency statute
violated the First Amendment as applied to the plaintiffs' dancing.'0
On remand the district court upheld the Indiana statute finding that
the type of dancing provided by the plaintiffs was not expressive conduct
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits [public inde-
cency], a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area
or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Id.
56. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (1991).
57. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728, 731 (N.D. Ind.
1985), rev'd sub nomL Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986), on remand,
Glen Theatre v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc,, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
58. Id. at 732. "'Overbreadth' is a term used to describe a situation where a statute pros-
cribes not only what constitutionally may be proscribed, but also forbids conduct which is
protected, e.g., by the First Amendment's safeguards of freedom of speech and press." Over-
stock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
59. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1986), on remand, Glen
Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., IIl S. Ct. 2456 (1991). The
Indiana Supreme Court said that "it may be constitutionally required to tolerate or allow some
nudity as a part of some larger form of expression meriting protection, when the communica-
tion of ideas is involved." State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind. 1979). Five years
later an Indiana appeals court dismissed a conviction under the statute in a case involving a
partially nude dance at the "Miss Erotica of Fort Wayne" contest. Erhardt v. State, 463
N.E.2d 1121, 1122 (Ind. App. 1984). The decision of the appeals court, however, was later
reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Erhardt v. State, 468 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1984).
60. Glen Theatre, Inc., 802 F.2d at 288-90.
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and therefore not protected by the United States Constitution.61 The
case was then, once again, appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 62 A panel of
that court reversed the decision of the district court holding that the type
of dancing at issue was expressive conduct and therefore was protected
by the First Amendment.63
The case was then heard, en banc, by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals."4 A majority of the court decided that nonobscene 5 nude pub-
lic dancing performed for entertainment is expressive conduct that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.66 They concluded that the Indiana
public indecency statute was an unconstitutional infringement on that
expressive conduct because it sought to prevent the message of eroticism
and sexuality conveyed by the dancers.67
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.6" In a five to four decision, the Court held that the statute, which
would require dancers in the challenging establishments to wear at least
"pasties" and "G-strings," did not violate the First Amendment.69
2. The Court's reasoning
a Chief Justice Rehnquist: The plurality opinion
In determining whether or not the dancing at issue in this case
should be considered "expressive conduct," Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
lied on previous Court decisions70 and concluded that nude dancing falls
within the purview of the First Amendment, but that it is only "margin-
ally" 71 within its "outer perimeters. ' 72 Although the Chief Justice be-
lieved that customary barroom dancing is expression,73 he suggested that
61. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind.
1988), rev'd sub nor. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd,
904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 2456 (1991).
62. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
63. Id. at 830.
64. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
65. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of obscenity.
66. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1085, 1087.
67. Id. at 1088.
68. 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
69. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
70. Id. at 2460; see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
71. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
72. id.
73. Id.
January 1992]
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it deserves only the "barest minimum" of constitutional protection. 74
Chief Justice Rehnquist next considered the proper level of protec-
tion for the expression in question. 75 He turned to the Court's decision
in United States v. O'Brien,76 which held that expressive conduct may be
narrowly regulated or forbidden if a substantial or important governmen-
tal interest is implicated and if that interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression. 77 He noted that the time, place and manner test78 was
originally developed to evaluate restrictions on expression taking place
on public property which had been deemed a "public forum,"' 79 but that
in the case of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 80 the doctrine was
used to evaluate a restriction on speech occurring on private property.8 1
Because the O'Brien and City of Renton tests are similar, Chief Justice
Rehnquist considered application of the O'Brien analysis appropriate in
this case.
82
In applying the four-part O'Brien inquiry83 to the facts of this case,
Chief Justice Rehnquist found that Indiana's public indecency statute fell
within the constitutional power of the state because: (1) it furthered a
"substantial governmental interest," that of protecting societal order and
morality;84 (2) the state's regulation was unrelated to the suppression of
expression because it was a general law uniformly applied to all public
nudity;"5 and (3) the statute was narrowly tailored as Indiana's require-
ment that the dancers wear at least pasties and a G-string was the barest
minimum necessary to achieve the statute's purpose.86 Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that it was permissible for the state to regulate pub-
lic nudity "whether or not it is combined with expressive activity. "87
74. Id. (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975)).
75. Id. at 2461.
76. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
77. Id. at 376-77. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
O'Brien test.
78. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time, place and
manner test.
79. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
80. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
81. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
82. Id. at 2460-61.
83. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
84. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
85. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited a number of public indecency prosecutions for activ-
ities having no communicative element. See, eg., Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ind.
1987); In re Levinson, 444 N.E.2d 1175, 1176 (Ind. 1983); Blanton v. State, 533 N.E.2d 190,
191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Adims v. State, 461 N.E.2d 740, 741-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
86. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
87. Id. Although not directly stated, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied that the nude as-
pects of the dance are nonexpressive elements of otherwise expressive conduct. Id. at 2462.
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b. the concurring opinions
i. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia began his concurring opinion by noting that he agreed
with the judgment of the Court upholding Indiana's public indecency
statute not because it survived some lesser level of scrutiny but because
the statute was unrelated to expression." Justice Scalia argued that
there is a distinction between actual "speech" and expressive conduct.8 9
He reasoned that the First Amendment specifically protects the "free-
dom of speech," meaning oral and written speech, but not expressive
conduct. 0 He noted, however, that when the government prohibits con-
duct precisely because of its communicative attributes, the regulation is
unconstitutional.9"
Justice Scalia believed that the appropriate First Amendment analy-
sis applicable to laws that do not directly or indirectly impede "speech"
starts with a threshold inquiry regarding whether the purpose of the law
was to suppress communication.92 If the statute was not intended to sup-
press communication, then it does not violate the First Amendment.93
Justice Scalia felt that Indiana's ban on public nudity was not intended to
suppress communication because the "intent to convey a 'message of
eroticism' (or any other message) is not a necessary element of the statu-
tory offense of public indecency; nor does one commit the statutory of-
fense by conveying the most explicit 'message of eroticism'" so long as
one does not commit any of the four specified acts in the process.94
Justice Scalia also considered the traditional role and treatment of
public nudity in American society. In Justice Scalia's opinion, our soci-
ety prohibits certain activities, including public nudity, not because these
He wrote, "[i]t can be argued, of course, that almost limitless types of conduct-including
appearing in the nude in public-are 'expressive,' and in one sense of the word this is true.
People who go about in the nude in public may be expressing something about themselves by
so doing." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "the court rejected this expansive notion
of 'expressive conduct' in O'Brien." Id.
88. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that "[a]lmost the entire
domain of Indiana's statute is unrelated to expression, unless we view nude beaches and topless
hot dog vendors as speech." Id. at 2464 (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d
1081, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990)).
89. Id. at 2465-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra note 55 for the specified acts forbidden by the
Indiana statute.
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activities harm others but because they are considered immoral. 95 Spe-
cifically, Justice Scalia said that "there is no basis for thinking that our
society has ever shared that 'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-
does-not-injure-someone-else' beau ideal-much less for thinking that it
was written into the Constitution."'96 He added that the Constitution
does not generally prohibit state regulation on the basis of morality.
97
ii. Justice Souter
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter98 first discussed the poten-
tially expressive and nonexpressive elements of both nudity and dancing
and pondered which elements should be entitled to First Amendment
protection.99 Justice Souter noted that neither "nudity'""°° nor "danc-
ing, 101 are per se entitled to blanket constitutional protection but con-
cluded that "nude dancing" is protected by the First Amendment
because the dancer's movements, in going from clothed to nude, are in-
cluded in the dancer's act for expressive purposes-specifically, to en-
dorse the message of eroticism.10 2
Justice Souter disagreed with the plurality's suggestion that society's
moral views are enough to justify the limitation at issue."13 Instead, he
based his concurrence on what he viewed as the state's substantial inter-
est in combatting the secondary effects caused by adult entertainment
establishments. 10
Justice Souter agreed with the plurality's application of the four-part
O'Brien inquiry to determine the proper level of protection required by
the First Amendment.105 In applying the O'Brien test to the Indiana
statute, Justice Souter relied heavily on the Court's previous decision in
95. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. Notably, this is Justice Souter's first independent opinion as a Supreme Court Justice
regarding the freedom of expression.
99. Barnes, I11 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
100. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
101. Id; see Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989) (ballroom dancing not protected
by First Amendment). Justice Souter also noted that dancing for aerobic exercise would be
outside of the purview of the First Amendment. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
102. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
103. See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring). Among the secondary effects referred to by
Justice Souter are increased prostitution, increased sexual assaults and the attraction of other
criminal activity. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 37, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26)).
105. Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
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City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 106
In City of Renton the Court upheld a city's zoning ordinance
designed to eliminate the secondary effects of adult entertainment by lim-
iting the placement of adult theaters to only five percent of the city.
10 7
Justice Souter noted that in City of Renton the Court did not require the
city to justify its regulation with studies showing harm from secondary
effects that were specific to that city. 08 Instead, the City of Renton was
allowed to rely on the studies and experiences of other cities. 0 9 Justice
Souter reasoned that the adult entertainment provided by the Kitty Kat
Lounge and the Glen Theatre was directly analogous to the adult en-
tertainment at issue in City of Renton."' Justice Souter concluded that
the Indiana statute was constitutional under the O'Brien test because the
State of Indiana could reasonably decide that forbidding nude dancing
furthers its interest in preventing prostitution, sexual assault and associ-
ated crimes. 11 Because this interest was unrelated to the suppression of
expression,11 2 the requirements of O'Brien were satisfied by the Indiana
statute. 113
c. Justice White: The dissenting opinion
Justice White, writing for the dissent, 4 fundamentally disagreed
with the reasoning of the plurality in a number of areas. First, he be-
lieved that the plurality was incorrect in assuming that Indiana's public
indecency statute was a law of general proscription. 1 5 Second, Justice
White believed that Indiana's statute was aimed at suppressing expressive
activity and should, therefore, be subjected to strict First Amendment
scrutiny. 6 Finally, he believed that banning an entire category of ex-
pressive activity did not satisfy the requirement that such regulations be
106. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
107. Id. at 53-54. The ordinance at issue in City of Renton protected approximately 95% of
the city area from the placement of motion picture theaters emphasizing "matter describing or
relating to 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' . . . for observation by
patrons therein." Id. at 44.
108. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
109. Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51 (City of Renton allowed
to rely upon experiences and findings of Seattle, Washington and other cities).
110. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 2470-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
112. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
113. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2471 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined in
Justice White's dissenting opinion. Id.
115. Id. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).
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narrowly tailored to promote a substantial governmental interest, 117 as
required by United States v. O'Brien.l"'
Justice White argued that Indiana's public indecency statute was not
a general prohibition, as asserted by the plurality and Justice Scalia.' 19
He noted that previous Supreme Court decisions upholding the state's
exercise of police power involved truly general proscriptions that forbade
the prohibited conduct wherever and whenever it might occur.12 ° In dis-
tinguishing the Indiana statute, Justice White noted that the statute did
not, and could not, constitutionally apply to nudity whenever and wher-
ever it might occur. 21 He reasoned that, for example, the statute could
not be extended to apply to people appearing nude in their own homes. 122
In addition, the statute had never been applied to performances such as
plays, ballets or operas, suggesting that the statute was not a general pro-
hibition and was not uniformly enforced.1 2
3
Justice White argued that because the statute was not one of general
proscription, O'Brien placed the burden on the state to explain why an
expressive element of the conduct was regulated (nude dancing) but a
nonexpressive element of the same conduct (appearing nude in one's
home) was not.
12 4
The Justice believed that the actual purpose of the Indiana statute
was to protect viewers from what the state believed to be the harmful
message communicated by nude dancing and not the potential damage
caused by nude appearances on city streets or in city parks.1 25 He felt
that Indiana aimed to prevent exposure to the communicative aspects of
the nude dance, specifically to its erotic message, in an attempt to limit
the harms that might follow from reaction to that message-such as in-
creased prostitution and the degradation of women. 126 Justice White be-
lieved that because the purpose of the statute was content-based it failed
117. Id. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting).
118. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
119. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)) (generally
prohibiting consensual sodomy even in one's home); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (generally prohibiting peyote use even in religious cere-
monies); O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (generally prohibiting draft card burning at all times and in all
places).
121. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (White, ., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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the third part of the O'Brien test 127 and therefore should be subjected to
the higher level scrutiny demanded of content-based restrictions on
speech.
128
In addition, Justice White believed that Indiana's statute was not
narrowly tailored, and therefore, failed strict scrutiny examination be-
cause it banned outright an entire class of expressive activity.1 29 He sug-
gested that there were less restrictive alternatives available to the state.
130
For instance, the state could require that nude performers remain a spec-
ified distance from the audience,13 ' that nude performances take place
only during designated hours, 132 or that establishments providing nude
entertainment be dispersed throughout the city.
33
III. ANALYSIS
A. Level of Scrutiny in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
In determining an appropriate level of scrutiny, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist rephrased petitioner's argument that the Indiana statute was a valid
time, place and manner restriction.13 1 The plurality's opinion stated that
the time, place and manner doctrine is generally used to evaluate restric-
tions on speech taking place on public property deemed a "public fo-
rum" 35 but in at least one case it was used to evaluate a restriction on
speech occurring on public property. 136 Chief Justice Rehnquist's exami-
nation of the "time, place and manner" doctrine ended there, however.
He noted that "this test has been interpreted to embody much the same
127. Id. at 2473-74 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
128. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473-74 (White, J., dissenting); see Sable Communications, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
129. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41 (1986)).
134. Id. at 2460. The time, place and manner test has been used to test a number of regula-
tions restricting speech in several cases including: Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 789 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). See supra notes 12-21
and accompanying text for a discussion of the time, place and manner test.
135. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
136. Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
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standards as those set forth in United States v. O'Brien," '137 and turned,
with no further mention of the time, place and manner test, to the four-
part inquiry enunciated in O'Brien. 3 '
Instead of applying the City of Renton time, place and manner test
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,"39 the Court chose instead to apply the
rule enunciated in O'Brien. The Court's choice of the O'Brien inquiry
can perhaps best be explained by examining the differences between the
City of Renton and O'Brien standards.
Under the City of Renton standard, any regulation restricting pro-
tected speech must further a substantial governmental interest and must
leave open an adequate alternative channel for the communication.
1 40
Therefore, if the City of Renton requirements were applied to the statute
at issue in Barnes, the statute would necessarily fail because it bans all
public nudity 4 -even nudity that is concededly expressive conduct-
while leaving no alternative avenue open for the protected communica-
tion. Alternatively, the O'Brien standard requires only that where
speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same conduct, the
conduct may be regulated if the government has a substantial interest in
doing so-even if the regulation proves to incidentally restrict the pro-
tected speech. 42 Therefore, a statute regulating nude dancing could po-
tentially pass the level of scrutiny required in O'Brien even though it
completely bans an entire category of expressive conduct.
A question naturally arises regarding the Chief Justice's choice to
scrutinize the Indiana statute using the O'Brien inquiry rather than the
time, place and manner inquiry as urged by the petitioners. 143 The plu-
rality's choice of O'Brien seems especially odd in light of the fact that the
time, place and manner test seems to have become the analysis of choice
for examining restrictions on forms of constitutionally protected adult
entertainment."4 One explanation is that in this case Chief Justice
137. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
138. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
139. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
140. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986).
141. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Bums 1985). See supra note 55 for the text of the
Indiana statute.
142. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
143. Id.
144. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46 (applying time, place and manner test to adult
theater zoning ordinance); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74-77 (1981)
(applying time, place and manner test to ordinance regulating nude dancing); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (applying time, place and manner test to
zoning ordinance targeting adult theaters); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975)
(applying time, place and manner test to ordinance regulating topless dancing).
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Rehnquist did not wish to uphold the Indiana statute merely on the basis
of the secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establish-
ments but rather on the basis of a state's "moral interest" in banning
such entertainment.
B. An Improper Standard
The statute at issue in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 145 is distinguish-
able from regulations analyzed under the O'Brien standard in several
other cases. 46 This dichotomy suggests that the application of the
O'Brien standard is inappropriate in this case. In Barnes Chief Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that because the time, place and manner test, as used
in Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence,147 is similar to the
O'Brien conduct versus speech distinction standard,148 the plurality
would apply the O'Brien test to the facts of Barnes.'49 Although both
tests are very similar, there are important differences."' 0 Perhaps be-
cause of this, the Court often applies both the O'Brien standard for sym-
bolic conduct and the time, place and manner test to the facts of a single
case. 151
In Clark, for example, the Court analyzed a National Park Service
regulation that forbade sleeping in parks not designated for overnight
camping.' 52 The Community For Creative Non-Violence wished to stage
demonstrations in two parks, both in the heart of Washington D.C., dur-
ing which symbolic tents would be set up to dramatize the plight of the
homeless.' 53 The organization was granted a permit to stage the demon-
stration on the condition that the demonstrators would not sleep in the
tents. 154
The Court in Clark primarily relied on the time, place and manner
test, 155 but considered the validity of the regulation under the O'Brien
145. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
146. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Brien standard.
147. 468 U.S. 258 (1984).
148. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460; see Clark, 468 U.S. at 293-94.
149. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
150. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Brien standard.
See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time, place and manner
test.
151. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985); Clark, 468 U.S. at 294-98;
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05, 808-10 (1984).
152. Clark, 468 U.S. at 289-91.
153. Id. at 291-92.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 294-98.
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standard as well.1 56 In Clark the Court found the regulation valid under
O'Brien because: (1) the government had a substantial interest in con-
serving National Park land; (2) the government's interest was unrelated
to the suppression of expression; and (3) the regulation was narrowly
tailored.
1 5 7
The Court's decision in Clark is arguably distinguishable from the
statute at issue in Barnes for several reasons. Clark involved a clear dis-
tinction between conduct and speech in that potential damage of the
parks would be the same regardless of who slept on the park grounds,
whether the camping was being done for expressive or nonexpressive
purposes. In Barnes, however, the state sought to avoid damage to the
public by preventing nude appearances in public places.158 It is conceiva-
ble that exposure to nudity could be harmful in limited circumstances,
perhaps with children" 9 or unwilling viewers. 1" It is hard to imagine,
however, that the same damage could be caused when consenting adults
congregate to view nude dancing in a private nightclub. It is even more
difficult to understand why sanctioned theatrical performances such as
ballets or operas would not cause the same damage. 6'
Even more important, in Clark the demonstrators could provide the
same message by remaining awake in the park or by staging their demon-
stration in a park that allowed overnight camping. 62 In Barnes, how-
ever, the nude portions of the dance provided an essential part of the
dancers' message. 163 Unlike the demonstrators in Clark, the dancers in-
volved in Barnes could not take their "demonstration" elsewhere because
the essential nude aspects of the dancers' message were illegal throughout
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991).
159. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (regu-
lating hours indecent speech may be broadcast on radio). But see Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating conviction for display of jacket reading "Fuck the Draft" even
though jacket potentially visible to children).
160. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. at 748; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975);
see, eg., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).
162. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
163. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 2471 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter specifically stated that "dancing as a performance directed to an actual or hypo-
thetical audience gives expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling, and where the
dancer is nude or nearly so the feeling expressed.., is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of
erotic experience." Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice White noted that the dancing
inherently "embodies the expression and communication of ideas and emotions." Id. at 2471
(White, J., dissenting).
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the State of Indiana.' As a result, the statute at issue in Barnes banned
an entire category of expressive activity, whereas the regulation at issue
in Clark did not.
The same is true of the Court's use of the O'Brien analysis in United
States v. Albertini.'65 In Albertini the defendant reentered a military base
during an open house ceremony after having been instructed, several
years before, that he needed explicit permission to do so because of prior
bad behavior on the base. 66 The Court found that the government's in-
terest in military security justified the neutral application of a statute that
required certain people to obtain permission before entering military ba-
ses 167 and that the regulation would be valid under both the time, place
and manner test'68 and the O'Brien test.1 69 As in Clark, the demonstra-
tor in Albertini had ample opportunity to voice his opinions elsewhere, or
even at the military base had he obtained the appropriate clearance. 170
Therefore, the neutral regulation involved in Albertini did not, in fact,
ban an entire category of expression as did the Indiana statute.
This same distinction extends to the facts of O'Brien. The demon-
strator in O'Brien would have had ample opportunity to convey the same
message by burning a copy of his draft card, for example, rather than the
actual card itself. 7 ' Because the Court found that the state had a valid
interest in preserving draft cards needed to facilitate quick induction into
the military"72 and because O'Brien had ample alternative means for his
communication, his conviction was upheld under the new test, estab-
lished in that case, for analyzing restrictions on expression where con-
duct and speech are combined.'73 The Court's decision in Barnes,
however, is distinguishable. Because of Indiana's blanket prohibition of
public nudity, the nude dancers at the Glen Theatre and at the Kitty Kat
Lounge did not have an analogous opportunity to convey their message
by some alternative method.
164. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1985).
165. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
166. Id. at 677.
167. Id. at 687.
168. Id. at 689. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time,
place and manner test.
169. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the O'Brien test.
170. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 687.
171. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that O'Brien
could have conveyed message in other ways).
172. Id. at 379.
173. Id. at 377, 382. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
O'Brien test.
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C Failure of the Statute Under the O'Brien Standard
Even if the plurality's choice of the standard from United States v.
O'Brien 174 is accepted, its application to the facts of Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre, Inc. 175 does not support the Court's holding. First, the plurality's
blanket assertion that the Indiana statute serves as a general prohibition
of the type upheld in O'Brien is arguably not supported by previous
Supreme Court precedent, 176 nor is it supported by the facts of Barnes. 177
Second, the plurality's assumption that the Indiana statute is unrelated to
the suppression of expression is erroneous.1 78 Finally, the plurality's as-
sertion that the statute is sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the
O'Brien requirement is incorrect.
1 79
1. General prohibition requirement
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the
"history of Indiana's public indecency statute shows that it predates bar-
room nude dancing and was enacted as a general prohibition."18 0 Chief
Justice Rehnquist cited several cases upholding the state's police power
in enacting general prohibitions including both O'Brien 181 and Bowers v.
Hardwick. 82 In O'Brien the burning of draft cards was generally pro-
hibited" 3 and in Bowers the act of engaging in consensual sodomy was
likewise generally prohibited.
18 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion that Indiana's prohibition of
public nudity fits neatly into the O'Brien and Bowers general prohibition
category is less than sound. Previous Supreme Court cases upholding
state exercise of police powers involved truly general prohibitions on in-
dividual conduct whereas the Indiana statute8 s does not. For example,
in Bowers the statute prohibited the act of consensual sodomy whenever
174. 391 U.S. 367, 377, 388 (1969).
175. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
176. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of previous Supreme
Court precedent in the area of nude dancing.
177. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Barnes.
178. See infra notes 201-16.
179. See infra notes 217-39.
180. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
181. Id. at 2460-61 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (upholding
general prohibition of draft card burning)).
182. Id. at 2462 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 & n.1 (1986) (upholding
general prohibition of consensual sodomy)).
183. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385.
184. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1, 189 (1986).
185. See supra note 55 for the text of the Indiana statute.
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and wherever that conduct might occur. 186 This prohibition extended
even into the privacy of the home.' 87 Analogously, in O'Brien the act of
burning draft cards was prohibited at all times and in all places.'
The Indiana public indecency statute falls outside of the category of
general prohibitions, however.'8 9 The statute facially prohibits all public
nudity' 90 but, to date, has not been applied to public nudity occurring in
other theatrical performances.' 9' In addition, the Indiana statute, unlike
the regulations at issue in previous Supreme Court general prohibition
cases, does not purport to regulate nudity occurring in the home.' 92 In
fact, a ban on nudity in the home would likely be untenable in light of
Supreme Court precedent such as Stanley v. Georgia,93 in which the
Court held that an individual could not be punished for the possession of
obscenity in the home.'94 Thus, the Indiana public indecency statute' 95
is not, in fact, a general prohibition of the kind previously upheld by the
Court.
The statute's enforcement history also shows that the Indiana stat-
ute is not one of general prohibition. On its face the statute bans all
public nudity, 196 however, the statute was given a specific limiting in-
struction by the Indiana Supreme Court to exclude its application in cer-
tain situations.' 97 The Indiana Supreme Court held that "it [may be]
constitutionally required to tolerate or to allow some nudity ... as a part
of some larger form of expression" 98 meriting protection, when the com-
186. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195; see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1984).
187. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
188. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370, 380. This reasoning has been extended to cases not
involving expressive activity. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 873 (1990), the Court held that the state's general prohibition on the use of peyote
was valid even though it prohibited use of the drug in religious ceremonies.
189. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367, 370 (discussing general prohibitions).
190. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Bums 1985). See supra note 55 for the text of the
Indiana statute.
191. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
192. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Bums 1985). The Indiana statute regulates only "pub-
lic" nudity.
193. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
194. Id. at 568. Subsequent cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
which upheld the right of married couples to use contraceptives and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), which extended this right to unmarried couples, suggest that the Court recog-
nizes the right to enjoy intimate relationships in the privacy of ones home as well as the right
to make choices regarding child bearing. See GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
CONSrrUTIONAL LAW 179-82 (4th ed. 1986). Arguably, a statute that forbids nudity in the
home would necessarily violate these rights and would, therefore, be unconstitutional.
195. See supra note 55 for the text of the Indiana statute.
196. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Bums 1985).
197. State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind. 1979).
198. Id. See supra note 59 for the text of the Indiana Supreme Court's limiting instruction.
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munication of ideas is involved. To date, there has been no attempt to
apply the statute to theatrical performances such as plays, ballets or op-
eras.19 9 In fact "no arrests have been made for nudity as part of a play or
ballet. ' '200 A statute that allows for and, following the Indiana court's
limiting instruction, requires that the statute not be applied to certain
types of public nudity cannot validly operate as a general prohibition.
When application of a statute depends upon the message that is being
conveyed rather than on the conduct itself, enforcement of the statute
can no longer be said to be general.
2. Suppression of expression requirement
The plurality opinion asserted the Indiana statute met the third part
of the United States v. O'Brien 2 01 test because the purpose of the statute
was unrelated to the suppression of expression.20 2 Citing many years of
Indiana public indecency laws,20 3 the plurality argued that the purpose of
the statute could not be to suppress the expressive elements of nude danc-
ing because similar statutes were in existence long before nude dancing
existed in Indiana.2°4 The plurality further argued that the only conceiv-
able purpose of these public indecency laws was to protect societal order
and morality. 205
The plurality's reasoning in this area perhaps can be best described
as linguistic maneuvering. Facially, a statute that prohibits public nudity
may promote the purpose of protecting order and morality. Along these
lines, there are somewhat restricted but valid reasons for preventing nude
appearances in unregulated public places such as "parks, beaches, [and]
hot dog stands. ' 20 6 The state has a limited but valid interest in protect-
ing children20 7 and unwilling viewers2 08 from offense. There seems to be
no valid reason, however, for preventing paying, consenting adults from
199. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting affidavit of Sgt. Timothy Corbett).
201. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
202. Id. at 376.
203. Id; see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1985); Ind. Acts, clh. 87, § 90 (1881)
(punishing open and notorious lewdness); Rev. Laws of Ind., ch. 26, § 60 (1831).
204. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 2464 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978). But
see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating conviction for display of jacket read-
ing "Fuck the Draft" even though jacket was potentially visible to children).
208. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975);
see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(regulating adult theaters).
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viewing nude dancing in theaters and barrooms. In these contexts, the
only purpose of the statute could be to prevent willing viewers from ex-
posure to the potentially harmful message conveyed by nude dancing.
The fact that certain theatrical performances, but not nude dancing, were
exempted from the statute's reach20 9 serves to strengthen the argument
that one of the statute's purposes was to prevent communication of the
message conveyed by nude dancing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the statute met the require-
ments of O'Brien because the state's interest in protecting societal order
and morality210 was not only valid-but was substantial and that such an
interest was unrelated to the suppression of expression.211 This argu-
ment must fail even if the Indiana statute is analyzed using the O'Brien
test for determining the validity of regulations burdening expression
where conduct and speech are combined.21 2 Supreme Court precedent in
areas such as flag burning makes clear that restrictions on conduct are
only acceptable, absent a compelling state interest, if the government's
interest in preventing the act is not the suppression of expression. 21 3 It
has been suggested that in order to test the government's motive in ad-
vancing the interest, one should consider whether the same harm would
be done if a person engaged in the conduct in the privacy of his or her
home. 1 4 In the case of nude dancing, Indiana asserts that it has an inter-
est in protecting order and morality regardless of where the conduct oc-
curs.21 5 Yet, the statute only applies to nudity that occurs in public.
2 16
More perplexing is why activities that are considered inherently
"immoral" suddenly become "moral" when performed in one's home. If
the regulation is truly content-neutral it should follow that participation
in the forbidden activity would harm the government's interest no matter
where the activity occurred. Situations, such as that presented by the
Indiana statute, however, in which an activity is forbidden only in a pub-
lic forum, suggest that the government's true interest lies not in prevent-
ing undesirable conduct but in suppressing the message that such
conduct has the potential to convey.
209. See supra note 55 for the text of the Indiana Statute.
210. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 2456, 2461-62 (1991).
211. d at 2462-63.
212. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
213. See, eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); see also Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (flag desecration); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)
(verbal insults aimed at flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (display of red flag).
214. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-3, at 801.
215. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
216. See supra note 55 for the text of the Indiana statute.
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3. Narrow tailoring requirement
Even if acceptable as a general proscription unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression, the Indiana statute cannot legitimately pass scru-
tiny under the third requirement of United States v. O'Brien 217-- that the
incidental restriction on expression be no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of the government's interest.218 Generally, a requirement
that a statute be narrowly tailored means that it targets and eliminates no
more than the exact source of the "evil" it seeks to remedy.219 The Indi-
ana standard, however, does not fit this description. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist argued that Indiana's requirement that dancers wear at least pasties
and G-strings is the "bare minimum necessary to achieve the state's pur-
pose. 220 Although this appears to be a convincing argument, 221 an ex-
amination of other available regulatory alternatives reveals the
argument's weaknesses.
States wishing to regulate adult entertainment have found a valuable
ally in the Twenty-First Amendment.222 In numerous cases,223 including
California v. LaRue,224 the Court has upheld state regulations that disal-
low the service of alcohol in establishments that provide adult entertain-
ment. Although the Court in LaRue determined that the Twenty-First
Amendment does not supersede all other provisions of the Constitution
in the area of liquor regulation,225 it has nevertheless afforded states
broad regulatory power where adult entertainment and alcohol are com-
217. 391 U.S. 369, 377 (1969).
218. Id. at 376-77.
219. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984);
see also Sable Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 124
(1989) (stating that regulations restricting speech must be narrowly drawn); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (stating that legitimate governmental alternatives could have been
achieved with less restrictive alternatives); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (gov-
ernmental objectives achievable through less restrictive means).
220. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Il1 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991).
221. Chief Justice Rehnquist is linguistically correct-you cannot get much "narrower" or
"more tailored" than pasties and a G-string. Chief Justice Rehnquist is using a play on
words-the allowable briefness of clothing, to substitute for the O'Brien requirement of nar-
row tailoring. It is doubtful that this is what the O'Brien Court had contemplated when it
decided that regulations restricting speech must be "narrowly tailored." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
377.
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. The text of the Twenty-First Amendment states: "The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohib-
ited." Id.
223. E.g., New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981); Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966).
224. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
225. Id. at 115.
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bined.226 Therefore, if Indiana wished to pass a statute that prohibited
the service of alcohol in establishments providing nude dancing, there
would be no constitutional barrier.
In addition to the states' broad Twenty-First Amendment powers,
the Supreme Court, first in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,227
and later in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,228 upheld the
power of cities to strictly curtail the placement of adult entertainment
establishments through zoning regulation.229 According to the results in
City of Renton 230 and Young,23' if a city wishes to eliminate the harmful
secondary effects caused by adult theaters, it may pass zoning ordinances
spreading the establishments throughout the city232 or ordinances con-
centrating adult theaters in very small areas,233 so long as some avenue
for the communication of protected expression remains available.234
The state's regulatory opportunities do not stop there, however.
The state would still be free to impose other reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions on nude dancing.2 35  For example, the state could
legitimately limit the hours during which nude dancing could be per-
formed2 36 or, as Justice White suggested in his dissent in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. ,237 the state could regulate the distance that the audience
must remain from the dancers.2 38 Thus, the O'Brien requirement that
regulations be narrowly tailored to impose the minimum necessary re-
226. In LaRue the Court noted that "[e]onsideration of any state law regulating intoxicat-
ing beverages must begin with the Twenty-first Amendment." Id. at 114 (quoting Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966)). The Court concluded that "the broad sweep of the
Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal
state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." Id.
227. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See infra notes 248-55 and the accompanying text for a discussion
of Young.
228. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Renton.
229. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55; Young, 427 U.S. at 63.
230. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.
231. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
232. Id. at 52, 63.
233. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.
234. Id. at 84; see Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
235. See, e.g., New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981); California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966). See also
supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time, place and manner test.
236. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regu-
lating hours during which indecent speech may be broadcast on radio).
237. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Generally, distance requirements place dancers out of the
audience's reach by requiring them to remain a specified distance from the audience or by
requiring the dancers to perform on an elevated stage. Requirements such as this have been
upheld by federal circuit courts. See, e.g., Key, Inc. v. Kinsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1060-61
(9th Cir. 1986).
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striction on speech239 is not satisfied by the Indiana statute.
D. Lesser Value Speech
1. Toward a theory of lesser value speech
It has been suggested that the Constitution's Framers would turn
over in their graves if they knew that the First Amendment was being
used to protect nude dancing.2" There is ample evidence to suggest that
many Supreme Court Justices, both of the past and present, feel the same
way.241 With few exceptions, however, the Court has traditionally held
that once an activity is deemed expressive, it is protected by the First
Amendment no matter what its value.242
In recent years, however, the notion that generally all speech merits
the same level of protection has become highly problematic. Tradition-
ally, all protected speech has been regarded as having the same First
Amendment protection.243 Just two terms ago, the Court reaffirmed its
belief that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that government may not prohibit expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."'2 " For a
number of years nonobscene sexually explicit adult entertainment has
necessarily been included in the category of protected speech.245 Perhaps
uncomfortable with the notion that speech of questionable social value is
239. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See supra notes 22-30 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
240. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1105, 1114 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Coffey, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
241. In an oft quoted passage in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976), Justice Stevens said that "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our
choice." Id. at 70.
242. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
243. See id.
244. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
245. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 61 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972). The Court's decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2456 (1991), is especially odd in light of recent Supreme Court precedent. For example, in
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986), the Court invalidated an ordinance drafted by a feminist group that
forbade "pornography" redefined as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women."
Id. at 324. This definition of pornography was substantially more narrow than the test previ-
ously established by the Court in cases such as Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See
supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of obscenity and the Miller stan-
dard. The court found the ordinance unconstitutional because it was an effort to control the
way people think about women and sex. American Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d at 325.
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deserving of precisely the same protection as core political speech,246 var-
ious Justices have sought to whittle away at the protection granted vari-
ous categories of speech including the category of adult entertainment. 247
The emergence of a theory of lesser value speech is most prominent in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 248 In more recent years the the-
ory seems to have gained greater acceptance249 as evidenced by City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 250 and Federal Communications Com-
mission v. Pacifica Foundation.251
In Young a plurality of the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordi-
nance that dispersed the location of adult movie theaters throughout the
City of Detroit.25 2  Although the regulation was seemingly content-
based, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, gave two reasons to jus-
tify the departure from the strict content-neutral standard previously ap-
plied by the Court. First, Justice Stevens reasoned that the statute did
not violate the content-neutrality standard in principle because the regu-
246. The Court has determined that political speech is " 'at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (quoting
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
247. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young Justice Stevens said that "Et]here is surely a less vital
interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography
and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political signifi-
cance." Young, 427 U.S. at 61.
248. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
249. This acceptance is evident in the area of commercial expression. In the case of Central
Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), Justice Powell established the
following four part analysis for examining restrictions on commercial speech. First, in order to
be protected by the First Amendment, commercial speech must concern a lawful activity and
must not be misleading. Id. at 564. Second, in order for commercial speech to be subject to
regulation, the governmental interest must be substantial. Id. Third, the regulation must di-
rectly advance the governmental interest asserted. Id. Finally, the regulation must be no more
restrictive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Blackmun asserted that this test created an "intermediate" level of scrutiny in the commercial
arena. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The test announced in Central Hudson Gas has
been applied in a number of commercial speech cases. E.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-69, 75 (1983) (invalidating federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mail-
ing of contraceptive advertisements); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
507, 521 (1981) (finding that restrictions on commercial billboard advertising do not violate
Constitution).
250. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (finding that city zoning ordinance regulating location of theaters
that show adult movies upheld under time, place and manner test previously reserved for
strictly content-neutral regulations).
251. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In upholding the FCC's censorship of comedian George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" monologue, the Court held that banning indecent words has a "primary effect
on the form, rather than on the content, of serious communication." Id. at 743 n.18. "[T]here
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id.
252. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
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lation did not regulate on the basis of point of view, rather the statute
sought to regulate the secondary effects caused by the presence of adult
theaters.253 Second, Justice Stevens argued that certain sexually explicit
expression is of lesser value than other forms of protected speech.25 4 The
Court ultimately upheld the regulation because it left open adequate
channels for the protected speech.
255
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation 2 6
the Court upheld a decision of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to censure a radio station that had broadcast comedian George
Carlin's satiric "Filthy Words" monologue.257 The monologue was aired
mid-day and contained several indecent although concededly not obscene
words.258 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found the monologue
"vulgar," "shocking" and "offensive" and said that because "content of
that character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under
all circumstances, we must consider its context in order to determine
whether the Commission's action was constitutionally permissible.
25 9
Ostensibly, the majority found the FCC's regulation valid as a measure
to protect children from exposure to offensive language and to protect
unwilling listeners from invasion of offensive language into their
homes.260 Practically, however, the Court's decision in Pacifica Founda-
tion stands for the notion that certain categories of speech, that the Court
feels are of a lesser value, deserve less protection, and thus, a lower level
of scrutiny will be used for regulations affecting these types of speech.261
Even more recently in City of Renton, the Court upheld a zoning
ordinance even more restrictive than that upheld in Young.262 Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Renton statute which
regulated only adult theaters was not content-based because the ordi-
nance was aimed not at the content of the movies shown at adult motion
picture theaters but at the secondary effects of such theaters on the sur-
rounding community.263 Justice Rehnquist's opinion was heavily criti-
253. Id. at 70.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
257. Id. at 730. The monologue included several words that "you couldn't say on the pub-
lic... airwaves." Id. at 751.
258. rd. at 731.
259. Id. at 747-48 (emphasis added).
260. d. at 748-49.
261. See GUNTHER, supra note 194, at 775-76 for a brief discussion of the theory of "lesser
value" speech.
262. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
263. Id. at 47.
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cized by Justice Brennan who authored the dissenting opinion., Justice
Brennan argued that the fact that the adult theaters may have caused
harmful secondary effects could potentially have given Renton a compel-
ling reason to regulate such establishments, but the mere fact that adult
theaters may have caused such effects does not make the regulation "con-
tent-neutral."26 Justice Brennan noted that when a regulation is con-
tent-based, any governmental action must be carefully scrutinized to
ensure that the communication has not been prohibited "merely because
public officials disapprove of the speaker's views." 2" Justice Brennan
concluded his opinion by noting that the warning of Young-that zoning
enactments not be used to suppress or greatly restrict access to lawful
speech 67---had not been heeded by the majority."'
2. The Barnes decision
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc. 269 suggests that the theory of lesser value speech continues to be
applied to otherwise protected expression. Evidence of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's belief that nude dancing constitutes a "lower" form of ex-
pression is prevalent throughout his opinions on the subject. In Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc. 270 Justice Rehnquist expressed the belief that customary
"barroom" nude dancing may be entitled to only the "barest minimum"
constitutional protection.' In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim 272
Justice Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger's dissent in which the
Chief Justice said that although nude dancing enjoys some form of pro-
tection, this "does not mean that there are not times and places inappro-
priate for its exercise." '273
Further indication that the theory of lesser value speech has been
accepted by the present Court may be inferred from the fact that the
Barnes decision marks a significant departure from prior Supreme Court
264. Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text for a
discussion of content-neutrality.
266. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
267. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976).
268. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
269. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
270. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
271. Id. at 932.
272. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
273. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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precedent in the area of adult entertainment.274 The underlying principle
in the Court's prior adult entertainment decisions was that nonobscene
adult entertainment could be heavily regulated but not banned;2 75 the
decision in Barnes significantly changes that standard. The Court's deci-
sion in Barnes makes it possible for a state to completely eliminate an
entire category of expressive conduct. The reasons for this change are
not completely clear.276 Perhaps because the Indiana statute could not
be upheld under any of the previous standards applied to adult entertain-
ment, the Court sought a new way to uphold the regulation. Because
restrictions on the freedom of expression must generally meet a very high
burden of justification, 77 the standard of United States v. O'Brien
presented the only viable alternative. Even the O'Brien standard, how-
ever, does not provide the proper fit for a statute of this nature.2  As
such, if closely examined under the O'Brien standard, the Indiana statute
should not have been upheld.
3. The dangerous path
The First Amendment covers a tremendous array of speech and pro-
tects widely differing varieties of expression. In a society where a unitary
approach to First Amendment scrutiny, vis-i-vis a single heavy burden
of justification, has admirably protected free speech, the wisdom of creat-
ing a bifurcated system for determining differing levels of scrutiny, on the
basis of the "value" of the speech is highly questionable. 9 Arguably, a
system that creates a hierarchy of speech categories would unduly frag-
mentize First Amendment analysis.280 In opinions spanning several de-
cades the Court has expressed discomfort with the possibility that
legislatures or judges themselves be permitted to make distinctions be-
tween valuable and less valuable speech. Justice Harlan, in Cohen v. Cal-
ifornia,2 8 1 noted that it is because "governmental officials cannot make
principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of
274. See supra notes 39-54 for a discussion of prior Supreme Court precedent in the area of
nude dancing.
275. See, eg., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976).
276. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
277. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 342 (1972). See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
standards necessary to impose a burden on expression.
278. See supra notes 174-239 and accompanying text for an application of the O'Brien stan-
dard to the Barnes case.
279. GUNTHER, supra note 194, at 775-76.
280. Id.
281. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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taste and style so largely to the individual." '2 8 2 Perhaps that is the reason
why, with very few exceptions, a unitary standard for reviewing restric-
tions on speech has, until recently, remained intact.
The trend toward allowing stringent regulation merely on the basis
of the value of the speech presents a very real danger. Attempts to distin-
guish "high" art from "low" entertainment could potentially give legisla-
tures and judges the power to regulate only laypersons' forms of "art"
and "entertainment" while leaving their own forms of "art" and "en-
tertainment" protected. Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals illustrated this point nicely. He argued that while the
entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to
those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as
viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not
differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who
... wants some 'entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye [at
the local pub].
28 3
It is precisely this type of distinction, on the basis of "content" and
"value" that the Court has long struggled to prevent.
A comparison of the dances performed by the dancers at the Glen
Theatre and at the Kitty Kat Lounge with a classic ballet, such as the
Dance of the Seven Veils from Strauss's Salome, reveals that the
"messages" of both dances are very much the same.28 4 Both types of
dancing convey an obvious message of eroticism. The success of both the
ballerina, in the performance of Salome, and the nude dancer, in the per-
formance of the barroom dance, depends heavily upon the communica-
tion of their sensual message.28 5 The differences between the Dance of
the Seven Veils from Salome and the performances at the Kitty Kat
Lounge and Glen Theatre are not differences of kind, nor of expressive
282. Id. at 25. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1976), Justice Black warned that if
"despite the Constitution... this Court is about to embark on the dangerous road of censor-
ship, .. . this Court is about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of censors that could be
found." Id. at 196.
283. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd in part sub nom.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
284. During the Dance of the Seven Veils in Strauss' ballet Salome, the dancer slowly
removes several veils of clothing and eventually wears nothing but a completely transparent
bodystocking--officially "nude" under the Indiana statute's definition. See Miller v. Civil City
of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (Posner, J., concurring), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). At the Kitty Kat Lounge and
Glen Theatre, the dancers dance on stage "with vigor but without accomplishment, to the
sound of a jukebox, and while dancing they remove articles of clothing (beginning, for exam-
ple, with a glove) until nothing is left." Id. at 1091 (Posner, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 1087.
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versus nonexpressive activity; nor do they reflect the differences between
arty nudes and naked bodies.286 The only "difference [is] in aesthetic
quality, and while such differences can redeem obscene art,... they can-
not justify the suppression of the nonobscene."287 Given the similarities
between these two forms of expression, one which remains protected and
the other which, after the Court's decision in Barnes, does not, the dan-
ger inherent in allowing the judiciary to rely on the unappealing nature
of the nude barroom dance to justify otherwise inappropriate regulation
is obvious.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has stated, "'[w]hen the govern-
ment, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of [expression] on the grounds that they are more offensive
than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power.' "288 The
Court's decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 28 9 suggests that this
statement may no longer carry substantial weight. In Barnes the Court
was faced with the decision of whether a state could constitutionally ban
an entire category of concededly expressive activity. When that activity
was nude dancing, the Court found that it could.
When questions arise regarding which types of speech should be
protected by the First Amendment, the temptation to make value judg-
ments always presents itself. Few would argue that restrictions on polit-
ical discourse should be strictly scrutinized. Likewise, few would argue
that certain categories of speech such as fighting words and obscenity
should be left unprotected. Confusion arises, however, when we are
forced to determine an appropriate level of protection for a category of
speech that is in a grey area-somewhere between the categories of
speech that we intuitively want to protect and those that, because of their
propensity to cause harm, we do not wish to protect at all. The category
of adult entertainment falls within such a grey area.
The proposition that "the First Amendment forbids the State of In-
diana to require striptease dancers to cover their nipples,"2 90 does in fact,
sound ridiculous. Many would argue that it is absurd to afford wildly
differing categories of speech (categories as different as political discourse
and nonobscene pornographic material) the exact same level of constitu-
286. Id. at 1095 (Posner, J., concurring).
287. Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 1088 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).
289. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
290. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1100 (Posner, J., concurring).
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tional protection. Perhaps it is unfortunate that the Constitution explic-
itly establishes only one broad category of speech but that is precisely
what the Constitution does. Because the Constitution offers no textual
guidance, any categorical distinctions made on the basis of the expres-
sion's value are necessarily left in the hands of judges and legislators.
Recognizing that no one man or woman can be perfectly impartial, the
Court has long struggled to prevent such classifications.
The danger in applying an analysis like that applied in Barnes is
apparent. It gives judges and legislators a broad power to censure unfa-
vorable or unpopular ideas. Although the vast majority of judges and
legislators fulfill their roles in a fair and unbiased manner, no matter how
well intentioned, some may occasionally favor their own ideas and values
over those of others. Potentially, the decision in Barnes will allow a se-
lect few to strictly regulate laypersons' forms of nude "entertainment"
while simultaneously leaving their own forms of nude "art" protected.
Although the prediction is an ominous one, evidence of such a trend
is already evident in Indiana where the indecency statute is regularly en-
forced against establishments offering "barroom" type nude dancing, but
is not enforced in situations where nudity is a part of established theatri-
cal performances such as ballets and operas. While it is possible that the
Constitution's Framers never imagined the First Amendment would be
used to protect nude dancing, they undoubtedly never imagined that the
First Amendment would be used to make arbitrary distinctions between
valuable and valueless speech.
Ingrid Kristin Campagne *
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